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In this paper we investigate the demand for local public school expenditures in
Sweden using survey data, a method previously never applied to Swedish data.
We compare our results to those of earlier US studies, where the same method
is used in a different institutional setup. Estimating a linear demand specifica-
tion, we find that demand is inelastic with respect to income and taxprice,
much in line with previous Swedish findings in a median voter framework. Es-
timation of a log-linear demand specification indicates that the elasticities of
demand for schooling are higher in Sweden than in the US. Testing the hy-
pothesis that municipal employees tend to have a higher demand for public
spending than others, we conclude that income, as well as taxprice and grants,
enters the demand function differently for the two groups of employees.
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1 Introduction
Publicly provided education has traditionally been an essential building stone
of the Swedish welfare society. As for many other publicly provided services in
Sweden, the local governments are responsible for supplying primary and up-
per secondary schooling. Evaluating the efficiency of local public provision of
schooling is an issue of central concern, not least since spending on schools
constitutes the largest single item of Swedish local government expenditures.
However, the task is problematic, since there is no market in which individuals’
demand can be observed. Estimating individuals’ preferences and their corre-
sponding income and taxprice elasticities is a necessary first step towards an
evaluation of local public sector efficiency.
The purpose of this paper is to use survey data – a method never previously
applied to Sweden – in order to investigate the demand for schooling. In par-
ticular, we will (i) estimate the income and taxprice elasticities and (ii) examine
whether municipal employees – because of their high stake in municipal
spending on schools – have significantly higher demand for local public school
expenditures than others. Finally, we will (iii) provide a comparative perspec-
tive by relating our estimates to two kinds of earlier studies.
First, we will put our findings in relation to comparable US studies, which
employ survey data to estimate demand for local public school expenditures in
an institutional environment different from the Swedish one. These include
Bergstrom, Rubinfeld & Shapiro (1982), Gramlich & Rubinfeld (1982a),
Rubinfeld, Shapiro & Roberts (1987), Bergstrom, Roberts, Rubinfeld & Sha-
piro (1988)
 and Rubinfeld & Shapiro (1989).
1 Do the elasticities differ between
the two countries, and if so, in what way?  In addition, we will discuss our re-
sults in relation to studies that utilize alternative methods to estimate the de-
mand for publicly provided local goods in a Swedish setting. Aronsson & Wik-
ström (1996) and Dahlberg & Jacob (2000) use the median voter model, while
Boije (1997) applies the hedonic method. All methods have their weaknesses,
but taken together they will hopefully give us a better understanding of the de-
mand for publicly provided services at the local level in Sweden.
                                                     
1 Survey data has also been applied by Preston & Ridge (1995) on UK data, by Rongen (1995)
on Norwegian data, by Shapiro & Papadakis (1993) on Australian data and by Schokkaert (1987)
on Belgian data.IFAU – Individual demand for local public schooling: Evidence from Swedish survey data 4
We use data from 1991, the year when the responsibility for providing pri-
mary and upper secondary education
2 was decentralized to the local level. At
this time, the share of pupils attending private schools was negligible. Despite
decentralization, the provision of a minimum standard of education to all – ir-
respective of income or residence – remained a national policy objective. This
was to be achieved through a grant system, with the aim of canceling out dif-
ferences in per capita costs across municipalities due to factors such as geo-
graphic location or demographics. Despite this, the variation in local per capita
spending on schools has been significant, warranting an investigation of the
preferences for local public school expenditures.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present the theo-
retical model. In section 3, we describe and discuss the data. Section 4 reports
and interprets the results, while section 5 extends the analysis by testing for dif-
ferences in demand between public and private employees. In section 6, finally,
we compare our results with those of earlier US and Swedish studies. Section 7
concludes.
2 A Model of the Demand for Schooling
2.1 Theoretical model
Assume that the individual (i) receives utility from private consumption ( ) i C
and publicly provided education, measured by per capita spending on primary
and upper secondary education ( ) i G  in i’s home municipality. The individual
maximizes the following utility function
( ) i i i G C U U , = (1)
subject to her private budget constraint
i i i y t C ) 1 ( − = (2)
                                                     
2 The primary education is compulsory, and covers the first to the ninth grade. In 1991, the upper
secondary school comprised two to three years of theoretical or vocational education.IFAU – Individual demand for local public schooling: Evidence from Swedish survey data 5
as well as to the municipal budget constraint 
3
i i i i i i i S N y N t G N + = (3)
where  i t  denotes the local tax rate,  i N  the population in the municipality,  i y
the municipality mean income and  i S  the per capita central government grants
targeted to schools in i’s home municipality. In equation (3) we see that an in-
crease in the individual’s own income has the same effect as an increase in
grants to the municipality. In reality, individuals are much more likely to be
aware of their own income than of the true size of intergovernmental grants.
This gives a budget-maximizing bureaucrat the opportunity to raise public
spending more than the citizens would like when grants from the central gov-
ernment increase. This phenomenon is named the flypaper effect in the litera-
ture, referring to the tendency for “money to stick where it hits”.
4 Bergström,
Dahlberg & Johansson (1998) also find different parameters on private income
and grants when investigating the demand for municipal labor in Sweden. This
suggests that (3) is only a special case, where the individual correctly perceives
the municipal budget constraint. In the spirit of Filimon, Romer & Rosenthal
(1982), we take this into account by including a term that captures the individ-
ual’s degree of grant illusion, ρi .
5  Thus, the individual’s perceived municipal
budget constraint, entering i’s utility maximization problem alongside the pri-
vate budget constraint, is
i i i i i i i i S N y N t G N ) 1 ( ρ − + = (3’)
where  0 = i ρ  is the special case of no grant illusion, as specified in (3), while
ρi = 1 indicates that the citizen does not recognize any grants to education.
                                                     
3 In order to simplify the utility maximization problem, we assume that the municipalities’ only
responsibility is to provide schooling, which results in a more comprised budget constraint than
in reality.
4 See, e.g., Bradford & Oates (1971) for an early discussion of the flypaper effect.
5 Unlike Filimon et al. (1982), however, we assume there is no tax illusion. Also, models de-
scribing the flypaper effect usually include a local bureaucrat who has potential gains of keeping
citizens unaware of the true level of intergovernmental grants. In this paper, we are using indi-
vidual data and are interested in how individuals’ demands are affected by their income and their
perceived level of intergovernmental grants. Hence, the grant illusion term in our model could be
interpreted as the citizens’ impression of flypaper effects, i.e. a grant perception parameter.IFAU – Individual demand for local public schooling: Evidence from Swedish survey data 6
1 0 < < i ρ  implies that the individual underestimates the actual amount of in-
tergovernmental grants (an alternative interpretation is that the individual dis-
counts some of the grants as being the politicians money).
For simplicity, we set φρ ii =− () 1 , and assume that all individuals have
the same perception of external grants, so that φφ i = , all i. Inserting (3’) into
(2) consequently yields
CG y S ii i i i i += + τφ τ (4)
From equation (4) we can see that the price for schooling will be given by
the individual’s taxprice,  i i i y y = τ , and that the individual’s income will
consist of two terms; personal income and the individual’s perceived share of
public income, φτii S . If there is grant illusion, an increase in the individual’s
income will have different effects on the demand for spending, depending on
whether the increase originates from more grants or a higher personal income.
In section 4, we will test whether this is the case.
Inserting (4) into (1) and assuming a specific functional form for the utility
function, we can derive a demand equation. In consideration of the comparative
perspective we want to pursue later on, we will use two different specifications.
First, a log-linear demand specification will be utilized since this type of speci-
fication is typically used in comparable American studies. In addition, we will
estimate a linear formulation that facilitates comparisons with some of the
Swedish studies as well as provides a test of how sensitive the results are to the
model specification.
2.1.1 Log-linear demand specification
In the log-linear case individual i’s demand for local public school spending,
*
i G , is given by
ln ln( ) ln ln
* Gy S x ii i i i j i j i
j
J
=+ + + + −
=
∑ ββ φ τ βτ β ε 01 2
3
(5)IFAU – Individual demand for local public schooling: Evidence from Swedish survey data 7
where the definition of the taxprice and the individual’s income is defined as in
(4). Furthermore,  i x  is a  1 × J  vector of socio-economic variables, β  a vector
of parameters to be estimated, and  i ε ln  is an independently and identically
distributed random variable.
A method to identify and test the flypaper effect, used by, e.g., Preston &
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2 1 1 0
* ln ln ln ln ε β τ β
τ
φ β β β (5’)
In equation (5’), we see that the two parts making up the individual’s in-
come are estimated as separate terms. Testing for the flypaper effect is the
same as testing the hypothesis that  1 = φ  (i.e.  0 = ρ ), or that  φ β β 1 1 = . Fur-
thermore, using this demand specification the income and taxprice elasticities
are represented by β1 and  2 β , respectively, which makes them easy to calcu-
late.
2.1.2 Linear demand specification
The linear model is derived by assuming a specific form of the utility function
6,
in which case we reach the following demand equation:
Gy S x ii i i i j i j i
j
J
* () =+ + + + −
=
∑ ββ φ τ β τ β ε 01 2
3
(6)
with the same definitions of taxprice, income and socio-economic variables as
in the log-linear specification. Again, we identify the grant illusion parameter
by separating the second term, which gives
Gy S x ii i i i j i j i
j
J
* =+ + + + −
=
∑ ββ β φ τ β τ β ε 01 1 2
3
(6’)
                                                     
6 This type of utility function is the same as used in the labor supply literature by, e.g., Hausman
(1980). See Dahlberg & Jacob (2000) for the formula.IFAU – Individual demand for local public schooling: Evidence from Swedish survey data 8











β ητ 2 = (7b)
2.2 Estimation method 
7
In our data, we do not observe 
*
i G  directly. What we do observe is whether in-
dividuals are satisfied with the home municipality’s efforts, or if they want the
municipality to spend more or less than at present. Combined with information
about the actual level of spending, we can estimate individuals’ preferences
using an ordered logit model. Next, we will describe how this is done.





ik k i z G ε β β ln ln
1
0
* − + = ∑
= (8)
where  i z  is a vector of regressors.
Let  i G  denote actual spending in the municipality where i lives. Assume
that individuals will express dissatisfaction with the level of public spending if
i G  deviates from 
*
i G  with a sufficiently large fraction, which we denote δ .
Hence, individuals will answer ”increase spending ” if  i i G G δ >
* , ”satisfied” if
i i i G G G δ δ ≤ ≤
*  and ”decrease spending” if  δ i i G G <
* .
                                                     
7 The estimation method used in this paper is the same method as was proposed and used by
Bergstrom et al. (1982).IFAU – Individual demand for local public schooling: Evidence from Swedish survey data 9





ik k i G z ln ln ln
1
0 − − + < ∑
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δ β β ε (9)
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0 − + + ≤ ≤ − − + ∑ ∑
= =
δ β β ε δ β β (11)
If we assume that  i ε ln  follows a logistic distribution with zero mean and
variance 
2
ε σ ,  σ εi ln  will have a logistic distribution with zero mean and unit





































































































where  () ⋅ F  denotes the cumulative distribution function.









































































































































Estimation of an ordered logit model yields the coefficients ( σ βk ) and
( σ 1 ), from which the elasticities of interest,  k β , can be obtained.  The esti-
mation process also produces two ”intercept terms”, in which the threshold
value is included; ( σ δ σ β ln 0 + ) and ( σ δ σ β ln 0 − ).
If we instead have a linear demand specification, we proceed in the same
way; that is, we combine the actual spending level in the home municipality
with the answers given in the survey in order to identify the individuals’ de-
mand and elasticities. More specifically, an individual is assumed to answer
”increase spending” if  δ + > i
*
i G G , ”satisfied” if  δ δ + ≥ ≥ − i
*
i i G G G ,




In this study we combine survey data from the Local Citizen Survey
9 with mu-
nicipal data. The survey consists of data on 7550 individuals living in 28
                                                     
8 Notice that the interpretation of δ  differs from above; there it was a proportion now it is a sum.
In order to get a comparative expression summarize δ  and 
i G  and divide by 
i G .
9 The principal investigator was Folke Johansson at the Department of Political Science, Göte-
borg University. The data set is handled and distributed by the Swedish Social Science Data
Service (SSD) at Göteborg University. A detailed description of the sample procedure and con-
struction of the survey is available in Johansson, Lorentzon & Strömberg (1993).IFAU – Individual demand for local public schooling: Evidence from Swedish survey data 11
Swedish municipalities.
10 It includes information on individual specific char-
acteristics such as the respondents’ age, sex, income, type of employment and
presence of children in the family. After deleting observations where we have
missing values on at least one of the variables of interest, we are left with 2298
observations
11. The respondents are asked about their preferences for publicly
provided local services. More specifically, they are asked the following ques-
tion:
(Q1) On this card are shown certain things for which the municipalities are responsi-
ble. Please indicate for each and every one of them whether you feel that it is urgent that your
municipality does more than it is doing at present, that generally speaking things are satisfactory
at present, that the municipality’s efforts should be diminished, or that you have no opinion about
it.
a)  School
b)  Child care
c)  Elderly care
d)  Culture
e)  Roads
f)  Social assistance
The question above has one important shortcoming; it does not link an in-
creased level of services to a corresponding tax increase. In order to control for
the individual’s willingness to pay for announced preferences, we need to use
more information from the survey. The question stated below serves our pur-
poses;
(Q2) Consider the following claim: It is more urgent to lower local taxes than to raise
the level of local services. Do you
a)  agree completely
                                                     
10 The municipalities are the following: Upplands-Väsby, Nacka, Tierp, Uppsala, Enköping, Ka-
trineholm, Eksjö, Kalmar, Staffanstorp, Kävlinge, Sjöbo, Trelleborg, Munkedal, Göteborg, Lyse-
kil, Ale, Tranemo, Grästorp, Töreboda, Lidköping, Kil, Surahammar, Västerås, Härjedalen, Sor-
sele, Kalix, Gällivare, Luleå.
11 The individuals left out of the sample due to missing values are equally distributed across mu-
nicipalities and with respect to socio-economic characteristics.IFAU – Individual demand for local public schooling: Evidence from Swedish survey data 12
b)  agree on the whole
c)  disagree on the whole
d)  disagree strongly
e)  have no opinion
If an individual considers it ”urgent the municipality does more than at present”
with respect to schools, but at the same time agrees (completely or on the
whole) with the claim in Q2, one would suspect that this person would have
expressed a different opinion in Q1, had this question been linked to increased
taxes. In order to capture individuals’ preferences for schooling, we therefore
combine the answer in Q1 to the one in Q2.
12
In doing this, we need to consider that question Q2 is not specifically linked
to schooling, but to local services in general. Consequently, a respondent con-
sidering it ”more urgent to lower local taxes than to raise the level of local
services”, may refer to the level of all local services but schooling. We take this
possibility into account by relating the answer given with respect to schooling
(alternative Q1a) to the individual’s average preference for local public spend-
ing, which we calculate by using the answers to Q1a-f. 
13 Thus, we control for
the individual’s willingness to pay in the following way:
A. If the individual
answers Q1a with ”more” or ”same”,
answers Q2 with ”agree completely”, and
expresses lower or the same preferences for schooling than for the
     average public service,
                                                     
12 It could also be argued that the individuals answering Q1a with ”urgent the municipality does
more” expresses an opinion for organizational change – which does not require an increase in the
tax rate – rather than more spending. In particular, this could be the case if they also agree with
the claim in Q2. Using the answers to an additional survey question, relating to school quality,
we could conclude the following; only a very small fraction – 4.6 percent – of the respondents in
this “critical group” expressed dissatisfaction with the school quality. This might be an indication
that interpreting ”urgent to do more” as a preference for increased spending is not too problem-
atic.
13 The preferences for the average public service is calculated by coding each answer as 1 if the
individual expresses a preference for less spending, as 2 if the individual is satisfied and as 3 in
case of a preference for more spending. Having done this, the mean is calculated, yielding a
value ranging from 1 to 3, to be compared with the answer given on question Q1a  (also ranging
from 1 to 3).IFAU – Individual demand for local public schooling: Evidence from Swedish survey data 13
   we interpret this as a preference for less spending on schools
B. If the individual
answers Q1a with ”more”,
answers Q2 with ”agree on the whole”, and
expresses lower or the same preferences for schooling than for the
      average public service
we interpret this as if the individual is satisfied and has a preference for the same level of
spending on schools
C. If the individual
answers Q1a with ”same”,
answers Q2 with ”agree on the whole”, and
expresses lower or the same preferences for schooling than for the
      average public service,
  we interpret this as a preference for less spending on schools
Otherwise we assume that the answer given in Q1a directly expresses the individual’s prefer-
ences.
In Table 1 we present the resulting frequencies of ”less-”, ”more-” and ”same-”
answers, divided according to employment status, sex, taxprice and income.
The figures in Table 1 indicate that public employees in general want more
spending on schools than private employees do, and women want more spend-
ing than men. The higher income people have, the more public spending on
schools is preferred. The same is, somewhat surprisingly, true for the taxprice;
the larger proportion of higher public spending that the individual has to pay,
the more spending is preferred. These figures do however not control for the
actual level of spending in the municipalities, and must be interpreted with
care.IFAU – Individual demand for local public schooling: Evidence from Swedish survey data 14
Table 1. Distribution of Preferences for School Expenditures
less same more
Full sample 0.171 0.347 0.482
Type of employee
Public employees 0.132 0.328 0.540
Private employees 0.203 0.344 0.453
Sex
Women 0.132 0.342 0.526
Men 0.209 0.352 0.439
Income
Income < 95000 0.171 0.401 0.427
95000 > Income > 140000 0.150 0.350 0.500
Income >140000 0.191 0.288 0.521
Taxprice
Taxprice < 0.68 0.168 0.395 0.438
0.68 < Taxprice < 1.04 0.148 0.360 0.491
Taxprice > 1.04 0.194 0.293 0.513
The municipal data set includes local school expenditures per capita, mean in-
come, per capita grants targeted to education, and population (see Table A.1 in
the appendix for a complete list of variables and Table A.2 for summary statis-
tics).
14 Using school expenditures instead of output, which is hard to measure,
will give biased estimates if variations in actual spending are influenced by cost
differences across communities rather than purely quantitative differences.
Teachers’ wages constitute a significant part of the production cost and it could
be a problem if wages differ much across municipalities for teachers of the
same ”quality” (education and experience). In 1991 there was however a cen-
tralized system of wage bargaining for teachers and any observed differences in
wage costs are more likely to represent differences in the number of teachers
and their experience rather than differing geographical wage setting strategies.
In addition, any structural cost differences that the municipalities cannot influ-
ence, such as demographic and geographical factors, are to be compensated for
                                                     
14 Source: Kommunförbundet and Statistics Sweden (1992).IFAU – Individual demand for local public schooling: Evidence from Swedish survey data 15
through the grant system. In 1991, the municipalities received grants targeted
to the school sector on the basis of structural factors such as the density of
school-aged children in the community, the share of immigrant children in the
population and the number and costs of programs run in upper secondary
school. As these grants are included in our analysis, in a way that was specified
in section 2, we should not expect the estimations to be biased due to structural
cost differences.
4 Empirical Results
Let us now turn to the estimations. We use two different specifications of the
demand equation; a log-linear and a linear one. For both the log-linear and the
linear specification we estimate a parsimonious model (Model 1) as well as an
extended model (Model 2). The former includes only the variables needed for
estimating the elasticities, i.e. spending per capita, income and taxprice.
 Model
2 also includes socio-economic individual specific variables. Some of these
variables, e.g. age, are likely to be correlated with income. As a result, we
should interpret the income elasticity in Model 2 as a ’pure’ effect of a mar-
ginal change in the individual’s income on demand in contrast to the composite
effect implied by Model 1. Furthermore, we include personal income and the
individual’s share of central government grants to education separately in both
models, as specified in the theoretical section.
The results from the estimations are presented in Tables 2 and 3.
15 Let us
begin our study of these by looking at the elasticities, presented in Table 2. In
all four specifications, the elasticities have the expected signs. It turns out that
it matters how we specify our model. The parsimonious models give higher
elasticities both in the log-linear and the linear specification. As mentioned
above, this is to be expected when socio-economic variables correlated with in-
come are excluded in the parsimonious model. We can also note that the elas-
                                                     
15 Testing whether our results are subject to the so called ’Tiebout bias’, i.e. the possibility that
the respondents’ choice of community in which to live is determined by their preferences for
school spending, we found no evidence of such a bias in our data. A thorough description of the
methodology used, the ensuing results and a discussion of these are given in Ahlin & Johansson
(2000).IFAU – Individual demand for local public schooling: Evidence from Swedish survey data 16
ticities are lower when we choose a linear, instead of a log-linear, specification
of the demand equation. For example, in the extended model, the point estimate
of the income elasticity is 0.69 in the linear specification, to be compared with
1.14 in the log-linear one. The corresponding figures for the taxprice elastici-
ties are –0.78 and –1.09, respectively. More precise statements about the mag-
nitude of the elasticities are, however, made difficult by the relatively wide
confidence intervals. In any way, the elasticities are statistically significant at
the one-percent level, with the exception of the income elasticity in the linear
model, which is significant at a five-percent level.
16
Table 2. Elasticities for local school expenditures
Log-linear Linear

















Notes:  i)  ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1-, 5- and 10-percent level respectively.
            ii) Standard error in parentheses
How about the citizens’ perception of external grants? Does a marginal in-
crease in grants and personal income, respectively, have the same effect on the
probability of demanding more school spending? Testing the hypothesis that
the coefficients of personal income and grants are equal, we could not reject the
null in any of our model specifications. There is thus no evidence that the indi-
viduals misperceive the amount of external grants to education. No grant illu-
sion means that the equality φ = 1 should hold. From the lower part of Table 3,
we can see that even though the point estimates are larger than one, the stan-
dard errors are very large and we cannot reject the hypothesis that φ = 1 in any
of the four cases.
                                                     
16 The standard errors of the elasticities have been derived using the delta method, see, e.g.,
Greene (2000).IFAU – Individual demand for local public schooling: Evidence from Swedish survey data 17
Table 3. Estimated demand for local school expenditures
Log-linear Linear






































































0 β -9.885 -4.821 11397.264 6633.903









N 2835 2298 2835 2298
Log L -2856.074 -2243.542 -2865.969 -2248.5032
LR chi2 (df) 75.720 (4) 192.67 (13) 55.93 (4) 180.75 (13)IFAU – Individual demand for local public schooling: Evidence from Swedish survey data 18
Notes:  i)  ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1-, 5- and 10-percent level respectively.
         ii) Standard error in parentheses
            iii) The LR-test tests the joint significance of all coefficients.
Turning to the socio-economic variables we find that, irrespective of which
specification is used, the probability of demanding more school spending in-
creases if the individual is female, municipally employed, of working age and
has children – in particular if these are of school age. In all setups, the coeffi-
cients have the expected signs and are statistically significant but in one case
(the dummy indicating whether the individual is 61-70 years of age). The three
coefficients used for deriving the elasticities also have the expected signs and
are significant on a one-percent level. The negative sign preceding the spending
coefficient tells us that a positive change in school expenditures decreases the
probability of demanding more spending. Correspondingly, an increase in the
taxprice decreases the probability of demanding more spending, while the op-
posite interpretation is valid when individual income increases.
Does it matter how we specify the dependent variable? Running the ordered
logit estimations on the basis of three alternative definitions of the dependent
variable, the qualitative results do not change.
17 The estimated coefficients,
elasticities and the associated standard errors are similar in magnitude, and the
statistical significance remains the same. We therefore conclude that the results
are not particularly sensitive to the definition of the dependent variable.
5 Public and Private Employee
Do public employees tend to have a higher demand for public spending than
private employees? Some support for this hypothesis was given by the above
analysis, where the dummy reflecting whether an individual is municipally em-
ployed was statistically significant (at a one percent level), hence indicating
that the constant in the demand equation differs for municipal employees and
                                                     
17 These alternative ways of adjusting for the individual’s willingness to pay are sum-
marized in Table A.3 in the appendix. The coefficient estimates and elasticities are
available from the authors on request.IFAU – Individual demand for local public schooling: Evidence from Swedish survey data 19
others.
18 Considering also the relatively high ratio of municipal employees to
total employment in Sweden, amounting to more than 20 percent at the time of
the survey, this issue seems relevant to investigate further. We will therefore
devote this section to tests for differences in demand between public and pri-
vate employees.
There are several reasons to expect demand to differ between these two
types of employees, one being that cutbacks in public spending might be asso-
ciated with decreasing job security in the public sector. Another hypothesis is
that public employees in general might be more prone towards public services
because of, e.g., their political identification. In both these cases, this will be
reflected by a differing constant in the demand equation for the two groups of
employees. Just assuming public employees to have higher demand for public
services because of some underlying taste parameter seems a bit unsatisfactory
however. Courant, Gramlich and Rubinfeld (1979b) put forth a theoretical
model where the reasons for differences in the demand equations are modeled
more thoroughly.
19 In the model, differences in demand are due to differences
in the budget constraints. The main mechanism is that the suppliers of the pub-
lic goods are in part their own demanders, with the private sector having little
to do but pay. Consider, for example, public sector wages. For a private em-
ployee, higher public sector wages mean that the public services have become
more expensive and she will hence demand less public service. For a public
employee, this is only one side of the coin, since higher public wages also im-
ply higher income. As a consequence, the price elasticity will be less negative
for public employees than for private employees and the income elasticity will
be higher.
Below we will test whether the hypothesis that demand differs for public
and private employees is true in Sweden.
20 More precisely, we will test if the
intercept as well as the slope coefficients differ for people employed by the
municipalities.
                                                     
18 We have chosen to use municipal employees rather than public employees (which also in-
cludes state and county employed) since the supply of education is a municipal matter.
19 The same topic is discussed in Courant, Gramlich & Rubinfeld (1979a) and in and Gramlich &
Rubinfeld (1982b).
20 It is worth noting that we are not testing the Courant-Gramlich-Rubinfeld model directly, since
their theoretical model is quite different from the one put forth in section 2.1 in this paper.IFAU – Individual demand for local public schooling: Evidence from Swedish survey data 20
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where  i D  takes the value 1 if the respondent is municipally employed, 0 oth-
erwise. From equation (13), we see that there are least three potential hypothe-
ses that we could be interested in testing:
H1: 0 = γ
H2: 0 = λ
H3: 0 = ϕ
H1 tests the hypothesis that the intercept is the same for municipal and non-
municipal employees, H2 the hypothesis that income, grants and taxprice enter
with the same parameters for the different employment types, and H3 finally
tests whether the effect of the socioeconomic variables is the same across em-
ployment types. As always, when there are a number of different hypotheses
one likes to test, there is the question of which order to test the hypotheses in.
In Table 4 we describe the procedure we have chosen. We use the traditional
LR-test given by
) ln (ln
U R L L LR − − = 2 , (14)
which under the null is distributed as 
2 χ  with as many degrees of freedom as
there are restrictions imposed.
Starting out with a model with no differences between municipal employees
and the rest of the population, and testing whether the intercepts differ, we see
from line i of Table 4 that we reject the null of equal intercepts. If we instead
test whether the slope coefficients on income, grants and taxprice differ (line ii)
we reject the null in this case as well. In line iii we test the hypothesis that the
socioeconomic variables have the same impact for the two different employee
types. Also in this case we reject this hypothesis.IFAU – Individual demand for local public schooling: Evidence from Swedish survey data 21




LR-test LR-test Critical value (df)
i.  0 = γ , given that  0 = =ϕ λ 351.96 357.93 3.84 (1)
ii.  0 = λ , given that  0 = =ϕ γ 259.94 370,38 7.81 (3)
iii.  0 = ϕ , given that  0 = = λ γ 361.49 368.38 15.5 (8)
iv.  0 = λ , given that  0 = ϕ ,  0 ≠ γ 8.25 13.94 7.81 (3)
v.  0 = γ , given that  0 = ϕ ,  0 ≠ λ 0.28 1.49 3.84 (1)
vi.  0 = ϕ , given that,  0 = λ ,  0 ≠ γ 10.91 13.72 15.5 (8)
vii.  0 = ϕ , given that,  0 ≠ λ ,  0 = γ 0.60 0.67 15.5 (8)
Note: The tests are conducted at the 5-percent level.
Is it the case that both the intercept and the three slope coefficients are different
for the two groups of employees? Assuming that the intercept differs and test-
ing whether the slope-coefficients for income, grants and taxprice differ as
well, we can reject the hypotheses that they do not differ (line iv). On the other
hand, assuming that that the slope coefficients differ and testing the null of
equal intercepts, we cannot reject the null (line v) for neither of the models. The
conclusions from these tests are clear-cut; a model with differing coefficient on
income, grants and taxprice for municipal and non-municipal employees seems
to work best.
Let us finally test for different slope coefficients on the socioeconomic vari-
ables. From lines vi and vii, we see that we cannot reject the null that they do
not differ, neither when we allow for different intercepts for the two types of
employees, nor when differing coefficients are allowed. Thus, we can conclude
that income, grants and taxprice enter differently for municipal employees,
while the constant term seems to be the same across groups, as is the effect of
the socio-demographic variables.
What happens with the income and price elasticities? Do municipal and
non-municipal employees react differently to changes in price and income? In
Table 5 we present the results from ordered logit estimations where we allow
for different impact of income, grants and taxprice for the two groups of em-
ployees and in Table 6 we present the resulting elasticities.IFAU – Individual demand for local public schooling: Evidence from Swedish survey data 22
Table 5. Estimated demand for local public school expenditures – municipal vs
non-municipal employees
Log-linear Linear
Estimate Standard Error Estimate Standard Error
Coefficient
Spending -1.808 *** 0.481 -0.00021 *** 5.47e-05
Income 2.099 *** 0.644 7.81e-06 *** 2.97e-06
Taxprice -2.030 *** 0.646 -1.365 *** 0.526
Grants 23.619 23.597 8.58e-05 1.3e-04
Income *Munic 0.178 *** 0.066 1.64e-05 * 8.98e-06
Taxprice*Munic 0.084 0.138 -0.049 1.381
Grants*Munic -62.720 ** 28.420 -4.6e-04 2.9e-04
Female 0.327 *** 0.088 0.281 *** 0.086
Age_30 0.811 *** 0.189 0.798 *** 0.186
Age_40 0.789 *** 0.207 0.828 *** 0.207
Age_50 0.703 *** 0.192 0.757 *** 0.192
Age_60 0.347 * 0.198 0.376 * 0.198
Age_70 0.118 0.201 0.153 0.201
Children 0.219 * 0.120 0.235 ** 0.119
Sch_child 0.354 *** 0.110 0.346 *** 0.110
0 β -5.215 -- 6631.259 --
δ 1.610 -- 1.559 --
N 2298 -- 2298 --
Log L -2238.55 -- -2242.28 --
LR chi2 (df) 200.65 (15) -- 193.20 (15) --
Notes: i)  ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1-, 5- and 10-percent level respectively.
           ii) Standard errors in parentheses.
            iii) The LR-test tests the joint significance of all coefficients.IFAU – Individual demand for local public schooling: Evidence from Swedish survey data 23







Income 1.161 *** 0.278 0.668 ** 0.317
Price -1.123 *** 0.277 -0.872 *** 0.300
Income, munic. employees 1.259 *** 0.289 1.739 ** 0.776
Price, munic.  employees -1.076 *** 0.280 -0.767 0.704
Notes:  i)  ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1-, 5- and 10-percent level respectively.
     ii) Standard errors are calculated using the delta method.
From Table 6, we see that the results are consistent with economic theory. Both
specifications indicate more elastic demand with respect to income, and less
elastic demand with respect to taxprice for municipal employees, although the
differences are rather small for the log-linear model. Looking at the linear
model, we see that the income elasticity for municipal employees is 1.74, to be
compared with 0.67 for the rest of the population. The corresponding figures
for the price-elasticities are  77 . 0 −  and  87 . 0 − . It hence seems like municipal
employees are less sensitive to rises in price than non-municipal employees and
that they increase their demand with approximately one percent more than non-
municipal employees when own income increases by one percent. The elastici-
ties are however not significantly (in a statistical sense) different for municipal
and non-municipal employees. It is also worth noting that the elasticities for the
non-municipal employees are very similar to the ones presented in Table 2.
6 A Comparative Perspective
A number of American studies estimate taxprice and income elasticities of de-
mand for local school expenditures using the same method as we do
21. Need-
                                                     
21 See Bergstrom et al. (1982) for a comparison between macro and micro estimates and Inman
(1979) for a review of demand estimates for public education as well as other local public serv-
ices.IFAU – Individual demand for local public schooling: Evidence from Swedish survey data 24
less to mention, the US system differs considerably from the Swedish one, with
respect to the school setting as well as other aspects. A comparison between
studies applying the same method of estimation is nevertheless of interest. It is
also of value to know whether our survey data estimates correspond to those
found in earlier Swedish work, where other methods have been employed. In
this section we will therefore discuss our results in light of earlier Swedish and
US studies.
6.1 A comparison with American studies
In Table 7 we list American studies estimating a log-linear demand equation,
using survey data. All of them examine the demand for local public school ex-
penditures
In contrast to our findings, Bergstrom et al. (1988) and Rubinfeld et al.
(1987) find evidence of Tiebout sorting, using Michigan survey data. Since our
data contains a set of randomly chosen municipalities across the country, and
only a few municipalities in the vicinity of larger Swedish cities, it is likely that
the mobility costs are considerably higher than in the Michigan data set. This
might explain the divergent results.
How do the elasticities of the US studies compare to ours? We can start by
noting that the US point estimates typically are lower than the ones we find.
This is true both in a parsimonious model and in an extended model where so-
cioeconomic variables are taken into consideration. Bergstrom et al. (1982) and
Rubinfeld & Shapiro (1989) estimate a model similar to our parsimonious one
(Model 1 in Table 3). As the resulting income elasticities (taxprice elasticities)
range from 0.83 to 0.93 (from -0.57 to -0.72), demand seems much less elastic
than according to our findings where, in the log-linear case, the point estimates
centers around 1.6, in absolute terms.
Comparing the results of the extended models, it can be noted that the US
estimations tend to control for a larger set of socio-economic variables than we
do in Model 2.
22 Not taking potential Tiebout sorting into account, the point es-
timates of the income elasticity (taxprice elasticity) run from 0.29 to 0.72
(from 0 to -0.70), while the Tiebout corrected estimates vary from 0.10 to 0.23
                                                     
22 In the survey used in this study, the questions relating to, e.g., the educational level, occupa-
tional status (employed/unemployed/welfare recipient), and citizenship of the respondent con-
tained too many missing observations for them to be included in the estimations.IFAU – Individual demand for local public schooling: Evidence from Swedish survey data 25
(from -0.11 to -0.87). Evidently, these results suggests considerably less elastic
demand compared to our log-linear case, while the “uncorrected” results are
not out of line with those of our linear demand specification.
Table 7. Estimated income/taxprice elasticities of demand for local school ex-






Models that do no control for Tiebout sorting 
23
Bergstrom et al. (1982) Parsimonious 0.83 -0.57
Extended model 1 0.49 -0.41
Extended model 2 0.38 -0.43
Gramlich & Rubinfeld (1982a) Extended model 1 0.29 -0.01
Extended model 2 0.35 -0.01
Extended model 3 0.41 0
Rubinfeld & Shapiro (1989) Parsimonious  0.93  -0.72
Extended model 1  0.72 -0.70
Extended model 2 0.70 -0.64
Rubinfeld et al. (1987) Extended 0.32 -0.32
Models controlling for Tiebout sorting
Bergstrom et al. (1988) Extended 0.23 -0.87
Rubinfeld et al. (1987) Extended 0.10 -0.11
Hence, the US studies typically find considerably lower elasticities than we do,
both with respect to income and price. Why are Swedes more sensitive to
changes in income and taxprice than their fellow Americans? This paper gives
no clear guidance in understanding why this is the case. Let us, however, de-
vote a few sentences to speculations. One potential explanation for the differing
                                                     
23 As the results from estimating a Tiebout corrected model are sensitive to the instrumental vari-
ables used, we believe that it is relevant to look at the estimates that do not control for potential
Tiebout sorting as well.IFAU – Individual demand for local public schooling: Evidence from Swedish survey data 26
results might be that education is more necessary for the well being of indi-
viduals in the US than in the Swedish social welfare state of the early 1990’s.
Compared to the US, the returns to education are relatively low. Knowing that
you are going to do relatively well regardless of your education, due to a guar-
anteed income floor and high marginal tax rates, might cause education to be
considered more of a luxury good than a necessity. This would imply higher
elasticities in Sweden, both with respect to income and taxprice.
6.2 A comparison with Swedish studies
At least four different methods are available when estimating the demand for
publicly provided services, for which there are no market; the survey data
method, used in this paper, the median voter model, the hedonic approach and
the random utility model. Each of these methods has their strengths and weak-
nesses. With the results pointing in the same direction, however, we will have a
more comprehensive picture of individual demand for local public goods in
Sweden.
In Table 8, we compare the results from this paper with the findings of ear-
lier Swedish studies using other methods. One fundamental difference to our
study is that these are based on macro or household data rather than micro data.
Also, they focus on demand for local public services in general, and not on a
specific sector such as education. This latter difference is to be kept in mind
when interpreting the results.
The models in the Swedish studies typically include variables reflecting
household or municipal characteristics (see Table 8). Thus, a comparison of re-
sults should primarily focus on those of our extended model (Model 2). Con-
sistent with our findings, attributes such as municipal age structure, presence of
children in the household and a woman head of the household are statistically
significant and positive, irrespective of the methodology employed.IFAU – Individual demand for local public schooling: Evidence from Swedish survey data 27
Table 8. Estimated income/taxprice elasticities of demand for local public
services in Sweden





i Hedonic 1990 0.09 -0.89






General model 0.87 -0.53






1987 GMM, static 0.45 -0.67








iv Survey 1991 Log-linear 1.13 -1.07
data Linear 0.73 -0.74
Notes:
i) Dependent variable: Marginal price of local public services. Household attributes: dispos-
able household income, age of the head of household, number of children in household, dummy
for female head of household, dummy for married head of household, dummy for one member
household.
ii) Dependent variable: Local public expenditures. Municipal attributes: per capita tax base,
median income, share of members in local council representing socialist parties, municipal age
structure, size and density of municipal population, respectively, dummy indicating geographic
location, total operating cost net of user fees.
iii) Dependent variable: Local public expenditures. Municipal attributes: median household
income before tax + taxprice * grants, household median income/household mean income, share
of population young and old, respectively, density of municipal population.
iv) Dependent variable: Local public school expenditures. Individual attributes: income be-
fore tax, taxprice, age, dummy for female, dummy for municipal employees, dummy indicating
presence of children younger than school age, dummy indication presence of children of school
age respectively.IFAU – Individual demand for local public schooling: Evidence from Swedish survey data 28
Boije (1997) and Aronsson & Wikström (1996) both use the same municipal
data set from 1990. Relying on hedonic price functions, Boije’s results indicate
substantially lower income elasticity than the median voter framework of
Aronsson & Wikström, or in any of the other studies, while the price elasticity
is higher. Relating these results to our point estimates, the price elasticity given
by the hedonic approach is of a similar magnitude as that of the linear demand
model. However, the income elasticity resulting from the linear specification,
corresponds more closely to those of the median voter model.
Dahlberg & Jacob (2000) take dynamics and endogeneity into account in a
panel for the years 1981-1987. The point estimates for the log-linear model in
that paper are lower than ours. Their estimates of a linear demand specification
on the other hand, are slightly higher, at least in the long run. Finally, when es-
timating a fixed effect log-linear model, they find somewhat more elastic de-
mand than we do in our log-linear version of the extended model.
To conclude, the elasticities we find in this paper are not out of line of the
ones found in earlier Swedish studies. The elasticities from the log-linear speci-
fication indicate, however, a somewhat higher sensitivity to changes in income
and taxprice than studies using different methods. This might not be so sur-
prising since these studies typically use a linear demand specification.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we have used survey data from 1991 to estimate individual de-
mand for local public school expenditures. In particular, we have estimated in-
come and taxprice elasticities. We have also tested the hypothesis that the pref-
erences of municipal employees differ from those of other types of employees.
In addition, we have compared the results found with those of i) earlier Ameri-
can studies using the same method as we do, and ii) earlier Swedish studies
using other methods.
In a log-linear setting, a model including individual specific socio-economic
variables indicates rather elastic demand, both with respect to income and tax-
price (1.14 and  09 . 1 − , respectively). Demand is found to be considerably
more elastic than in US-studies using survey data to estimate demand for local
public school expenditures. In addition, our elasticities are higher than the ones
typically found in earlier Swedish studies. Estimations of a linear demandIFAU – Individual demand for local public schooling: Evidence from Swedish survey data 29
specification indicate considerably less elastic demand (0.69 and  78 . 0 − , re-
spectively), which to a large degree is consistent with previous findings for
Sweden based on a median voter framework, in particular in a setting where
dynamics is controlled for.  Remember, however, that the earlier Swedish
studies investigate total local public spending rather than school spending
alone.
From our analysis of whether there are significant differences in demand
between municipally employed and others, we conclude that income as well as
taxprice and grants enter differently in the demand function for municipal em-
ployees. On the other hand, we cannot find evidence of differences with respect
to the constant term, or the socio-economic variables. As predicted by theory,
the income elasticity is higher for municipal employees than for others. The
price elasticity associated with municipal employees is lower than for the other
group of employees. However, the differences in the elasticities are not signifi-
cant, in a statistical sense.
Besides employment status, being female, of working age and presence of
children in the household increases the probability of demanding more spend-
ing on schools. Not controlling for these individual characteristics yields con-
siderably higher income and taxprice elasticities (in absolute terms).
Evaluating the efficiency of local public provision of schooling cannot be
accomplished by demand elasticities alone. An important task for future re-
search is therefore to investigate the supply side more thoroughly. Also, from a
comparative perspective it would be interesting to estimate the demand for to-
tal local public spending using survey data. Finally, a theoretical model ex-
plaining differences between private and public employees’ demand for public
spending, adapted to the Swedish setting, would be a useful contribution to lo-
cal public finance.IFAU – Individual demand for local public schooling: Evidence from Swedish survey data 30
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Appendix
A.1. Variable definitions and summary statistics
Table A.1 Definitions of variables
Variable Description
INCOME respondent’s gross income
TAXPRICE respondent’s taxprice (respondent’s gross income/municipal mean income)
GRANTS grants per cap * taxprice (linear model)
(grants per cap * taxprice)/income (log-linear model)
FEMALE 1 if female, 0 otherwise
AGE_30 1 if the respondent is 18-30 years; 0 otherwise
AGE_40 1 if the respondent is 31-40 years; 0 otherwise
AGE_50 1 if the respondent is 41-50 years; 0 otherwise
AGE_60 1 if the respondent is 51-60 years; 0 otherwise
AGE_70 1 if the respondent is 61-70 years; 0 otherwise
MUNIC 1 if employed by municipality; 0 otherwise
CHILDREN 1 if children 0-6 years of age; 0 otherwise
SCH_CHILD 1 if children under the age of 16; 0 otherwise
SPENDING municipal spending per capita on primary and secondary schools
Table A.2 Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
DEP VAR 2.311 0.746 1 3
INCOME 125369.7 114114.5 1000 3564000
TAXPRICE 0.940 0.809 0.006 25.3
GRANTS 
a 3483.4 383.1 2828.7 4377.8
FEMALE 0.494 0.500 0 1
AGE 43.277 15.7 18 80
MUNIC 0.203 0.403 0 1
CHILDREN 0.223 0.417 0 1
SCH_CHILD 0.311 0.463 0 1
SPENDING 7321.7 1019.1 5666 9618
Note: a) This is the ”clean” grant variable, that is, it is not multiplied by taxprice.IFAU – Individual demand for local public schooling: Evidence from Swedish survey data 34
A.2. Alternative definitions of the dependent variable
Table A.3 Alternative ways of controlling for willingness to pay when the indi-




Alt. 1 Alt. 2 Alt. 3
























”More” Less Same Less Less Less Same Less More
”Same” Less Less Less Less Less Same Less Same
Note: * See description on pages 12-13.